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Rapper GAI, Style and Hegemony in China: Examining a Trans-
formation from Jianghu Liu to Xinhua Liu
Zhaoxi (Josie) Liu1
Unlike several studies on rap musicians and the lyrics of their songs, this study 
examines both obvious and obtuse meaning embedded in the styles of Chinese 
Rapper, GAI, and their implications for hegemony in his country. Following state 
censorship, GAI changed his style from that of a gangster to a patriot. On the 
surface, the style change indicates sustaining the hegemony upheld by the CCP 
(Chinese Communist Party). However, this study argues that the state crackdown 
on hip hop culture, its styles included, engenders a paradox for hegemony in China.
Keywords: GAI, Chinese hip hop, style, hegemony, obtuse meaning, signification
In 2017, rap musician GAI won China’s première rapping competition, “The Rap 
of China” (hereafter, The Rap), streamed on iQiyi, China’s Netflix equivalent. He 
quickly became the face of China’s burgeoning hip pop culture. In early 2018, he 
was invited to a major singing television show, “The Singer” (hereafter Singer) on 
Hunan TV. After the first round, he quietly disappeared, although he was not voted 
out (Zhang, 2018). His disappearance was significant: just when it appeared that rap 
had finally moved from the subcultural realm to China’s mainstream entertainment 
arena, it was pushed back. As Hall (1982) points out, popular culture is the site 
of struggle of meaning between the dominant and subordinate groups; “where 
hegemony arises, and where it is secured” (Hall, 2006, p. 487). The present study 
therefore examines rapper GAI’s styles, rather than his lyrics, in order to highlight 
the peculiar challenges style can pose for hegemony in a political system.
Background: The Rise and Fall of GAI and Hip Hop Culture in China
GAI is musician Yan Zhou’s stage name.  He was born in 1988 in Neijiang, Sichuan, 
a small city next to Chongqing, China’s fourth provincial-level municipality. He was 
a bar singer in Chongqing before joining GO$H, a local hip hop label and started 
writing and performing rap songs (Da, 2015). GO$H was one of the underground 
hip hop groups that mostly performed at nightclubs and released music through 
the internet. From the 2000s, hip hop not only gained popularity and tremendous 
following among the youth in Chongqing, but also in many large cities in China. This 
“wild growth” is largely attributable to the influence of hallyu (the Korean wave), 
American hip pop, Taiwan and Hong Kong singers (Barrett, 2012; Clark, 2012; Hu 
& Lai, 2004; Jia, 2018; Lin, 2017). Consequently, some independent labels began 
to release rap records, hip hop dancing classes appeared in colleges, and rap 
battles where underground rappers competed in improvising “free style” were held 
in Shanghai and Beijing (Amar, 2018; de Kloet, 2005; Khiun, 2006; Liu, 2010).
However, what turned the underground hip hop into a pop culture phenomenon 
was the 2017 internet show, The Rap. iQiyi invested more than 200 million yuan 
(about US$30 million) to produce the show, which was first streamed online in 
June 2017 (China National Radio, 2017). After several rounds of competition 
1 Zhaoxi (Josie) Liu is an associate professor in the Department of Communication, Trinity 
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by hundreds of rappers, GAI and another rapper from northern China, PG One, 
became co-champions as they won the same number of votes cast by the studio 
audience and the judges (Liang, 2017).
The Rap was an internet sensation, garnering more than 1.3 billion views 
(Amar, 2018). GAI, PG One and other participating rappers became instant 
music celebrities. After the competition, GAI appeared in several mainstream 
entertainment shows on national TV, including Singer, a hit show in which 
professional singers compete for the title of “the Singing King.” The success of The 
Rap and GAI’s subsequent appearance on mainstream TV shows largely signified 
that hip hop was no longer an underground musical phenomenon (Jia, 2018; Sina 
Entertainment, 2018; Zhi, 2017).
On January 4 and 5, 2018, three prominent national institutions, China Women’s 
Daily, the Youth Communist League, and China’s Xinhua News Agency denounced 
via Weibo (China’s social media platform) PG One’s 2015 song, Christmas Eve, for 
containing drug references (“pure white powder”) and insulting women (“bitches”), 
citing complaints from netizens. Following the denunciations, all of PG One’s 
songs were removed from stores and online streaming platforms (Amar, 2018; He, 
2018, “PG One,” 2018).
On January 12, 2018, the first episode of Singer was aired and GAI performed 
a rap version of “Cang Hai Yi Sheng Xiao” (“Blue Sea Laughter”). GAI was ranked 
3rd among the seven singers competing in the first round, and advanced to the 
next round (He, 2018). On January 18, 2018, a day before the second episode 
was to be aired, the Chutian Metropolis Daily confirmed that GAI was “requested 
to withdraw” from the competition (Zhang, 2018). The next day, Sina Entertainment 
posted an online notice issued by China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) that clearly stated that TV shows could not 
feature artists with tattoos or use “hip hop culture, subculture and dispirited culture” 
(An, 2018; Amar, 2018; Quackenbush & Chen, 2018). Thus, after several years of 
free growth, hip hop in China faced a major government crackdown.
Main Themes in Literature on China’s Hip Hop:  
Authenticity and Counterhegemonic Voice
Hip hop in China has attracted considerable scholarly attention, one of the main 
themes being that Chinese hip hop lacks authenticity. Some scholars argue that 
due to the dominance of foreign artists in China’s hip hop scene in the early 
2000s (Jing, 2006), China’s hip pop is a “cultural pollution” that clouds both the 
Chineseness and purity of the music genre (de Kloet, 2005).
However, the impression that Chinese hip hop as just copycat began to change 
when Chinese rappers, particularly those in Chongqing and Chengdu, two mega 
cities in Southwest China, started to rap in their local dialect rather than Mandarin. 
This gave Chinese hip hop a unique flavor and sense of originality (Amar, 2018; 
Barnett, 2012; Jing, 2006; Kahn, 2009; Khiun, 2006; Liu, 2014; Starman, 2019). 
China has hundreds of different dialects which differ in tones, pronunciation and 
sometimes vocabulary. Many rappers mixed Mandarin, English and their local 
language in their work, offering Chinese rap a “form a multimodal, hybridized 
semiotic ensemble,” which allows the rapper to “articulate authenticity on his own 
terms” (Wang, 2015, p. 236).
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The present study does not focus on this issue of authenticity, but the hegemonic 
implications of hip pop culture in China, which is another main theme in the 
literature. For Chinese youth, the biggest appeal of hip hop lies in its opportunity 
for self-expression and individualism (Barnett, 2012; Steele 2006), and a forum to 
resent China’s rigid education system (Amar, 2018; Wang, 2009).  Hip hop culture 
offers young Chinese “ready-made ways to assert individualism in a society that 
still emphasizes public displays of conformity” (Fackler, 2002).
Several rap songs also criticize social issues, asserting “an oppositional, 
counterhegemonic voice against the … mainstream discourse” (Liu, 2014, p. 266). 
Some of the songs complain about the urban chaos and moral decline brought 
by the migrant workers (Liu, 2014), marginalized status of some citizens (Steele, 
2006; Kahn, 2009), social injustices (Liu, 2010; Wang, 2009), and a sense of being 
left out of China’s economic boom and their desire for success (Barnett, 2012; Lin, 
2017; Liu, 2010; Steele 2006; Wang, 2009).
Most of the studies mentioned above focus on the counterhegemonic expressions 
in their lyrics. In this study, the focus is on another essential element of hip pop 
culture: style, using GAI as the subject of analysis. Since political messages 
conveyed through lyrics are very risky in China and many rappers are wary of that 
(Kahn, 2009; Liu, 2010), the non-verbal discursive elements, such as style, bear 
significance and deserve close examination.
Style, Signification and Hegemony
In this study, the author attempts to establish the connection between signification 
and hegemony in the analysis of GAI’s style. Hebdige (1979), who provides a key 
study on the style of subculture, does not provide a clear definition of style, but offers 
ample clues for understanding the concept, such as the “most mundane objects—a 
safety pin, a pointed shoe, a motor cycle” that take on a symbolic dimension and 
convey certain meaning that usually carry “subversive implications” (p. 2). Besides 
the most mundane objects, Hebdige (1979) examines outfits and accessories 
that convey “the dreams and the disappointments of an entire generation” (p. 41). 
Style could also be about non-objects, body language, expressions, postures and 
gestures, all of which could mean defiance, contempt or acceptance etc.
Style is also an integral part of hip hop culture in China. These include oversize 
parkas, low-rise baggy jeans, necklaces, basketball boots and body piercing that 
set the fashion trend among young people (Clark, 2012; Fackler, 2002; Hu & Lai, 
2004). Wearing Andl sports shoes and playing basketball on the streets express 
a different identity than wearing Nike or Adidas (Clark, 2012). Hair style is another 
form of expression, be it blonde colored hair or dreadlocks (Fackler, 2002; Liu, 
2010). In short, hip hop style “lets Chinese young people express themselves 
physically and visually” (Liu, 2010, p. 151). As such, hip hop style has meaning 
and political implications.
Signification of Style
As Hebdige (1979) observed, “objects are made to mean” (p. 3). This process of 
“made to mean” is signification. Drawing on the works of Barthes (1977), Hebdige 
(1979) and Kristeva (1973), the current study analyzes GAI’s styles at two levels: 
the “obvious meaning” and the “obtuse meaning.”
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Subcultural style could be read as signs (Hebdige, 1979). “A sign is anything…
that stands for something other than itself” (Danesi, 2004, p. 4). The object (of 
style) is the signifier, and its meaning is the signified. The Stoics, considered the 
first to formulate a theory about the sign, placed signification “in the position of 
necessary relation” between “the out-there and that which speaks it, the thing 
and the word” (Kristeva, 1973, p. 26). In conventional semiotics, “the process of 
signification is, thus, the relation X=Y itself” (Danesi, 2004, p. 12).
Subcultural styles deliberately appropriate objects from various sources and turn 
them into signs. For instance, “lavatory chains were draped in graceful arcs across 
chests encased in plastic bin- liners. Safety pins were taken out of their domestic 
‘utility’ context and worn as gruesome ornaments through the cheek, ear or lip” 
(Hebdige, 1979, p. 107). Through such a style, the punks “were able to restate 
their position to dominant values and institutions” (Hebdige, 1979, p. 116), which 
is a position of resistance and contempt. In this manner, the meaning of the signs 
(e.g., the lavatory chains and safety pins) is rather obvious. “It is what the author 
wanted to say” (Barthes, 1977, p. 54). At the level of the obvious meaning, the 
signifier corresponds with a definite signified.
However, the signifier does not always have a definite signified. When 
examining certain elements of punk style more carefully, Hebdige (1979) found 
the signified elusive. Therefore, conventional semiotics, which intends to establish 
a fixed connection between the signifier and the signified, cannot fully explain the 
meaning of subcultural style. “Any attempt at extracting a final set of meanings 
from the seemingly endless, often apparently random, play of signifiers in evidence 
here seems doomed to failure” (Hebdige, 1979, p. 117). Instead, Barthes (1977) 
proposes an additional way of reading style, that of the “obtuse meaning” (p. 54).
The idea of the obtuse meaning breaks the “relation of necessity” (Kristeva, 
1973, p. 28) between the signifier and the signified, and opens “the field of 
meaning totally, that is infinitely” (Barthes, 1977, p. 55), as the obtuse meaning is 
“polysemous” (Barthes, 1977, p. 56). Obtuse meaning exists “when the text is read 
(or written) as a moving play of signifiers, without any possible reference to one or 
some fixed signifieds” (Barthes, 1977, p. 10). The current study examines both the 
obvious (clear correspondence between the signifier and the signified) and obtuse 
(uncertain, polysemous) meaning of GAI’s styles.
To further complicate the matter, style is rendered meaningful through “dialectic 
between action and reaction” (Hebdige, 1979, p. 2). Action is the style itself, 
reaction is how society responds to it. Eventually, how the style comes to mean 
and what it means is a “process of meaning-construction” (Hebdige, 1979, p. 118), 
which involves the “manner in which the society to a certain extent communicates 
what it thinks of it [message of a symbol]” (Barthes, 1977, p. 17). The current study 
also examines this action-reaction dynamic in the case of GAI.
Hegemony
The meaning of subcultural style bears complicated implications for hegemony. In 
Gramsci’s writing, hegemony means the “cultural, moral and ideological leadership 
over allied and subordinate groups” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 423). Hegemony is a special 
kind of power. It is “the power to frame alternatives and contain opportunities, to 
win and shape consent, so that the granting of legitimacy to the dominant classes 
appears not only ‘spontaneous’ but natural and normal” (Clarke et al., 1976, p. 38). 
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A hegemonic cultural order prescribes “not the specific content of ideas, but the 
limits within which ideas and conflicts move and are resolved” (Clarke et al., 1976, 
p. 39). Gramsci is also clear about the importance of “culture and thought” to the 
“moment of hegemony and consent” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 195). These points apply 
to hip hop culture as well.
To win the spontaneous consent of the subordinate groups, the dominant group 
has to take into account their interests and tendencies (Clarke et al., 1976; Forgacs, 
2000). The site of consent is civil society, which is “the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 306), in opposition to “the state 
(political society) which is a site of coercions, dictatorship, domination” (Forgacs, 
2000, p. 224). Coercion or direct domination is used when “spontaneous consent 
has failed” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 307). “So hegemony cannot be taken for granted…
It has to be won, worked for, reproduced, sustained” (Clarke et al., 1976, p. 40).
In China, the dominant group is the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and its top leadership. It rules through its massive network of party organizations 
and state institutions, including media control mechanisms. The hegemony in 
China could be called the Party hegemony. The Party and state systems are in 
the hands of a group of political, business and intellectual elites (de Burgh, 2017; 
Khiun, 2006; Zhao, 2008), whereas the common people could be considered the 
subordinate group. Rappers, who are mostly marginalized urban youth, are part of 
the subaltern (Liu, 2010; Liu, 2014; Steele, 2006; Kahn, 2009; Wang, 2015).
The signification of hip hop style can be connected with hegemony, in that 
hip pop style, with its obvious and especially obtuse meanings, poses a unique 
challenge to the Party hegemony. Consequently, the present study attempts to 
provide answers to the following research questions (RQs):
1. What is the obvious meaning of GAI’s styles?
2. What is the obtuse meaning of GAI’s styles?
3. What are the implications of these meanings for the Party hegemony in 
China?
Method
Data for this study are from videos of GAI’s performances. His rise to prominence 
in China’s hip hop culture makes him a good case for this study, especially due to 
the fact that he is one of first—perhaps the only one—rappers to emerge from the 
underground to the mainstream stage, only to be censored by the state.
Seven videos from three different stages of GAI’s career were chosen to analyze 
his style. These are videos of his most popular songs or performances highlighted 
in the media, and are still available on YouTube. Below is a brief description of the 
seven videos (see Appendix for links to the videos):
Stage 1: Before The Rap, 2015 – June, 2017.
• Chao Shehui (Gangsta) music video, released in 2015. It established 
GAI’s fame as a Chongqing dialect rapper (Starman, 2019).
Stage 2: From The Rap to the state ban, June 2017-January 2018.
• Three live performances during The Rap competition: Tian Gan Wu Zao 
(second round); Kong Cheng Ji and 108 (final round), June-September 2017.
• Performance on the China Central Television (CCTV) show, I Want to Be 
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on Chun Wan: Hou Guo Di Liao (Hot Pot Soup Base), December 2017. 
Chun Wan is the CCTV Chinese New Year Gala, a five-hour live variety 
show consisting of singing, dancing, acrobatic display, comedy sketch and 
many more. Performing at the gala is the benchmark for recognition as a 
mainstream artist. I Want to Be on Chun Wan is a talent show to choose 
some performers at the gala.
• Performance on Singer: Cang Hai Yi Sheng Xiao (Blue Sea Laughter), 
January 2018. The song is a popular pop song in China, first released in 
1990. GAI added a rap segment to it.
Stage 3: After the Ban in May, 2018.
• The Great Wall music video, released in June 2018.
 Each video was viewed multiple times by this author, to identify and review 
the style as carefully and closely as possible. Drawing on Hebdige’s 
(1979) and Hall & Jefferson’s (1976) analysis of subcultural styles, this 
study focuses on the following aspects of the rapper’s styles:
• Outfit: clothing, jewelry and other accessories, including tattoos.
• Facial expression: expressions rendered by mouth, eyes, and so on.
• Body language: movements of body, arms, legs, and feet, and hand 
gestures.
• Demeanors: specific behavior and attitude.
• Vocal style: particular vocal characteristics, sounds and utterances.
On the basis of the above factors, this researcher then proceeded to do a 
qualitative textual analysis of GAI’s style at two levels: the obvious and obtuse 
meaning. This method of analysis is essentially where researchers “evaluate the 
many meanings found in texts and we try to understand how written, visual and 
spoken langue helps us to create social realities” (Brennen, 2017, p. 204). To further 
contextualize and triangulate the analysis, clips from The Rap, documentaries 
about China’s hip hop, one-on-one media interviews with GAI and other related 
material were examined by this researcher.
Findings and Analysis
This section first describes GAI’s styles in the three different stages, then offers 
the obvious and obtuse meaning of the styles, followed by a discussion on their 
implications for hegemony.
GAI’s Styles: From Jianghu Liu to Xinhua Liu
During Stages 1 and 2 of GAI’s career, from his pre-The-Rap years to after the 
competition but before the state ban, he was labeled as the lead man of Jianghu 
Liu rap (Feng, 2017). The Chinese word, jianghu, translates to big river or lake.  In 
Chinese literature, jinaghu is used as a metaphor for the world out there, or more 
specifically the social realm outside the mainstream establishment; the world of 
swordsmen and outcasts. The world of gangstas is a typical jianghu. “Liu” means 
flow or style. Jianghu liu therefore means jianghu style, a reference to China’s 
version of gangsta rap. This style is evident in GAI’s early music video, Gangsta, 
and his performances on The Rap and Singer.
In those performances, GAI’s outfit is mostly loose t-shirts and jackets, paired with 
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white sneakers or black boots, and occasional pair of round-shaped sunglasses. 
He usually wears a gold chain, gold earrings, and eyebrow slits. His hair is always 
extremely short. In the “Gangsta” MV and his live performance in clubs, he often 
goes topless, revealing the tattoos on his neck, chest and arms (Amar, 2018; Shi, 
2015; Starman, 2019).
His facial expression is sometimes disdainful, amplified by exaggerated lifting 
of one corner of his mouth, head tilting up while looking down with eyes squinted 
(Gangsta), or staring intensively with eyes wide open (The Rap; Singer).
GAI’s body language mirror his facial expression, as  he waves hands violently, 
shakes his head wildly, swings his arms forcefully, kicks his legs high, and stomps 
ferociously. He shows his middle fingers in the Gangsta music video, but not in the 
shows. He walks with a wobble and big arm swings, described in Chinese as “da 
yao da bai” (big strut, swaggering).
His demeanor is that of a bad boy. In Gangsta, he holds a cigarette in one hand 
and wields a long butcher’s knife in another. He squats in the street while rapping, 
drinks beer, and plays cards bare-chested. During a pre-show interview on The 
Rap he points his finger at the camera, with his signature head-tilting-looking-
down gesture, threatening those contestants who he calls “fake” and “technical 
garbage,” telling them to wait for him to “clear all of them out of the show.” He adds, 
“Let me burn, and bomb them to death” (Tian Gan Wu Zao).
GAI’s vocal style is consistently forceful, very loud and powerful. He sings, 
literally, at the top of his lungs, and at times shouts angrily. In Gangsta he repeatedly 
shouts: “Laozi is from the street!” “Laozi” is a vulgar slang for “I” in Chinese, usually 
used by hooligans, gangsters and people with little education, indicating rudeness 
and toughness.
Overall, the jianghu style, evident in Stages 1 and 2 of GAI’s career, is a style 
of gangsta swagger. It is rough, tough, raw, and vulgar. It is arrogant, aggressive, 
energetic and passionate. However, there are visible style changes between the 
Gangsta music videos and televised shows. On those shows, he is fully clothed to 
cover up his tattoos. He reverently bowed and thanked the judges and audience; 
no more mouth-twisting and face contortions. The closer he is to the mainstream, 
the softer his style becomes. When he stands on CCTV’s stage, the center of 
China’s mainstream media and entertainment, his jianghu style is tuned down to 
nearly zero. On that show, his clothing is rather fit than baggy and completely 
covers every trace of his tattoo. He does not wear the gold chain and earrings, his 
trademark throughout The Rap. His hand waving is much softer. There is no kicking 
or stomping, only CCTV-choreographed happy dancing; no staring or sneering, 
but cheerful grin. His vocal is also softened and tuned down. The gangsta persona 
disappears.
Yet, mellowing down his gangsta swagger did not earn him a place on the 
Chinese New Year Gala. Instead, like other rappers, he was banned from television 
altogether. For a few months after the ban, he slowed down his work and got 
married to his longtime girlfriend. When he resurfaced with a new single in May 
2018, he had transformed from jianghu liu to xinhua liu (Ifeng Music, 2018; Sina 
Entertainment, 2018). “Xinhua” means new China. GAI now wears a new China 
style. The new single, “The Great Wall”, and its music video mark a clear departure 
from GAI’s jianghu style.
9International Communication Research Journal 54(2), 2019
In the new music video, GAI wears a sportswear from Li-Ning, a Chinese brand. 
His jacket has the character “China” printed at the front. In some scenes he dons 
a Chinese style kong fu suit with a big cape. The sun glasses and gold chain are 
still there, making him look like a rapper, but his tattoos are completely concealed. 
He still tilts his head up and looks down his nose, but the sneering is no more. His 
body language retains the waving, kicking and head shaking, but not as wild and 
fierce as in previous videos. His swagger is turned down a notch. His cigarette or 
long knife now give way to a giant Chinese ink brush writing calligraphy all over 
the floor. His vocal is still forceful and powerful, but instead of screaming about his 
personal aspirations, he shouts about national pride.
From the tattoo-showing, knife-wielding, and sneering rapper squatting in shabby 
streets in the Gangsta to the fully clothed, straight faced rapper standing on top 
China’s scenic Great Wall in The Great Wall, GAI had migrated from jianghu to the 
mainstream style.
Signification/Meanings of the Styles
In this section, the meaning of GAI’s varying styles is explored at two levels: the 
obvious and the obtuse.
The Obvious Meaning: From Grassroots Identity to National Identity. The 
obvious meaning is what rapper GAI wanted people to get. Some elements of the 
jianghu style—the tattoos, sneer, middle finger, etc.—are signs, and their signified 
is a grassroots identity. GAI is a migrant from a small city (Neijiang) trying to make 
it in a huge metropolis (Chongqing). He made a living by singing pop songs and 
later rapping in bars and clubs and often ran out of money. He said he used to fight 
people “in order not to be bullied” and was beaten by the police as a teenager (Da, 
2015). In a 2015 interview, GAI sided with the urban poor: “There is a big disparity 
between the rich and the poor in China. Why are there people in China who wield 
knives trying to kill people? That is because you don’t let them live…He cannot 
get what he wanted; no education, no connections, and family background is not 
strong. Just like me” (Da, 2015). Therefore, the tattoos, gestures, and behavior 
signify his grassroots identity: rough, tough, aggressive and unyielding. Such a 
style allows him to “convey directly the most ordinary social topics and values” 
(Feng, 2017), to depict “the most realistic, the so-called social groups [unemployed 
idlers]” (Tencent Entertainment, 2017). He wanted people to see him as someone 
from the streets.
In contrast, the xinhua style uses a different set of signs: the outfit by a Chinese 
sportswear brand, the “China” print on it, the ink brush, kong fu suit, and above 
all, the Great Wall. The signified of these signs is a national identity. Speaking of 
the motivation for writing The Great Wall GAI said: “I feel that the country is really 
great, and I just want to showcase my patriotism” (Sina Entertainment, 2018). 
As patriotism is a mainstream value promoted by the Party, such a change could 
also help with marketing and sales of his music. His change of style—concealing 
tattoos, wearing a straight face, restraining from cussing, and better behaving—is 
also intentional; he wants people to notice his new identity. “With xinhua liu, I want 
to make it a new direction for China’s rap,” GAI explained (Sina Entertainment, 
2018). He told Sina Entertainment that he has always tried to integrate Chinese 
cultural elements with foreign music styles, and that he wanted to celebrate 
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Chinese culture (Ren, 2019). From the jianghu style to the xinhua style, the obvious 
meaning of the change is to move from a grassroots identity to a national identity.
The Obtuse Meaning: Polysemy of the Swagger. Some elements of GAI’s 
styles, such as tattoo, clothing and hand gesture can be analyzed as signifier 
with clear signified, but some are signifiers without clear signified. Most of his 
swagger—the waving, kicking, stomping, headshaking, staring, and powerful 
vocal—fall under the latter category, as the signified of those signs are not clear. 
For GAI the swagger, whether as part of his jianghu or xinhua style, is very likely a 
trademark. He uses a style to establish “an alternative identity which communicated 
a perceived difference: an Otherness” (Hebdige, 1979, p. 88-89). This identity is 
that of a rapper, of hip pop culture, which sets himself and fellow rappers apart from 
other musicians and entertainers. The swagger is also part of the entertainment 
that appeals to the audience.
Nonetheless, due to the lack of clear signified, the polysemy of the signs, 
his swagger could be interpreted quite differently. Some view his swagger as 
toughness, “the most fierce, aggressive and yet free roaming” (Feng, 2017), or 
as bringing “abundance of defiance and wildness” (Tencent Entertainment, 2017). 
The jianghu association has also been interpreted as inheriting the “rebellious 
cultural heritage” (Feng, 2017) of grassroots heroes like the 108 rebels in Water 
Margin. Such readings are problematic for the state, which further deems such a 
style, and by extension the person who displays it, as a threat, even though GAI 
himself does not necessarily mean to challenge the political order. When he kicks, 
stomps and stares on stage in The Rap and Singer, it is really hard to say that he 
is threatening anybody in particular. He is just a performer.
As earlier discussed, the meaning of style is assigned by both action and 
reaction. When the authorities banned GAI, they essentially pointed to resistance 
as the meaning of his jianghu style. In reality, GAI might not have wanted to be 
seen as a rebellious grassroots hero, yet the crackdown made it officially so. As 
the rapper suggested, “Music is music. Just be the best of myself is enough. Don’t 
think about other things” (Tencent Entertainment, 2017).
Implications for Hegemony
Both the obvious and obtuse meanings of GAI’s styles have complex implications 
for the Party hegemony in China. After the crackdown, GAI voluntarily abandoned 
the jianghu style, substituting it with the xinhua style, moving from the grassroots 
identity to establish a national identity (obvious meaning). This suggests victory 
for the Party hegemony. However, a closer examination reveals that the ban and 
its impact may have engendered a paradox for the Party hegemony, whereby 
hegemony is simultaneously maintained and undermined.
Paradox of the Crackdown. As already discussed, the realm of hegemony is 
civil society, in contrast to the “direct domination or command exercised through the 
state and juridical government” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 306). Direct domination is not 
hegemony. By ordering GAI off air and banning the hip hop culture altogether from 
broadcast, the government resorted to coercion, direct demand and dominance, 
rather than spontaneous consent. The crackdown therefore is not a hegemonic 
move. Even if hip hop culture in China, including GAI’s celebration of a grassroots 
identity through the jianghu style, does contain counterhegemonic expressions, it 
11International Communication Research Journal 54(2), 2019
cannot obliterate hegemony from the system. Instead, counterhegemonic voices 
tend to reproduce and sustain hegemony. So, it is in the interest of the dominant 
group to incorporate counterhegemonic voices into the mainstream, rather than 
shut them out with a sweeping ban (Hebdige, 1979). A clear indication of the 
weakening of a hegemonic order “is the shift in the exercise of control from the 
mechanisms of consent to those of coercion” (Clarke et al., 1976, p. 40).
Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, ideological control has been 
heightened across the Chinese society, including pop culture (Agence France-
Presse, 2018; Amar, 2018). President Xi wants pop culture to convey the “positive 
energy” of socialist values, while rap, with its vulgarity and gangsta swagger, 
appears to contradict these values (Amar, 2018). On the surface, the crackdown 
on hip hop appears to maintain hegemony, but underneath, the application of 
coercion could actually undermine hegemony.
Paradox of the Impact of the Crackdown. In a way, the crackdown worked. 
The “abrupt official backlash against hip hop culture has tamed the swagger of 
artists” (Agence France-Presse, 2018). GAI abandoned his jianghu style and went 
for the xinhua style. He now sings about nationalism rather than individualism, 
concealing his tattoo and behaving himself. Even the Youth Communist League 
now praises him for conveying the “positive energy of traditional spirit” to the 
younger generation through rap (Tencent News, 2019). Reacting to the ban, GAI 
said, “I respect all the arrangements of the state.” His fame and financial gain 
has given him a sense of security, which he very much cherishes. “I don’t rebel 
my current life,” he said (Sina Entertainment, 2018). This is GAI’s spontaneous 
consent. The censorship therefore worked “to bring hip-hop back into the Chinese 
cultural conversation, and also to demonstrate that no style of music, however 
popular, is exempt from toeing the Party line” (Amar, 2018, p. 112). The dominant 
group thus appears to have succeed in containing the subordinate groups “within 
an ideological space” (Hebdige, 1979, p. 16).
But, has it? The crackdown triggered some backlash online among rap music 
fans. Some of the comments include:  “SAPPRFT is so trashy! They didn’t want 
to give Chinese hip pop singers any chance of survival! We can go back to 
ancient times” (Quackenbush & Chen, 2018); “I have always believed that an evil 
establishment is not going to be satisfied with our appeasement” (“How to View,” 
2018). In Gramscian terms, this is the moment of collapse of the spontaneous 
consent.
The crackdown also created a chilling effect among the rappers, who now face 
“more careful screening” for “ideological mistakes” in their music (Agence France-
Presse, 2018). The space for hip hop artists in China is even tightly squeezed 
and such tight control generates discontent. “We’ve gotta find a way. But we 
don’t want to have to ‘find a way’ to express ourselves. We just want to express 
ourselves,” says Shanghai rapper, Naggy (Agence France-Presse, 2018). What 
people in power cannot deny is that “young people with lower socioeconomic 
status appreciate rap and hip hop because it expresses their feelings, emotions, 
and attitudes, and, more importantly, it helps make their voices heard” (Liu, 2010, 
p. 151).
To win spontaneous consent, the dominant group has to recognize the interests 
and the tendencies of subordinate groups (Clarke et al., 1976; Forgacs, 2000). 
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The disadvantaged urban youths has the need to express themselves through hip 
hop. Rapper Mr. Wang said “rapping helps him deal with bitterness that comes with 
realizing he is one of the millions left out of China’s economic boom” (Wang, 2009). 
Hip hop allows young people to vent dissatisfaction with the adult society. This 
helps “alleviate (the) psychological pressure laden on them” (Hu & Lai, 2004), and 
“to some degree has social amendment function” (Feng, 2017). Such pressure-
release function helps to maintain the consent of the subordinate groups, and also 
hegemony. Cracking down on hip hop seals this safety valve and social pressure 
keeps accumulating. When people are left with no channel to express discontent 
in non-confrontational ways, they may be forced into open confrontation, thus 
threatening hegemony.
Hip hop also provides a route to success—from rags to riches (Hebdige, 1979)—
for young people who are otherwise “losers” in society. “Many underground kids 
hope to change their life and future through music,” says GAI (Sina Entertainment, 
2018). That is perhaps why thousands of rappers flocked to The Rap. On the show, 
many rappers sang about their hard life as underground rappers, their desire for 
recognition, earn money and live a better life. The rappers hope the show and 
television appearance would ultimately lead to fame and finance gain. However, 
the state ban took away their hope, and likely their consent. When consent fades 
away, hegemony tends to be undermined (see Figure 1).
Conclusion
This study demonstrates that rapper GAI’s style and hip hop in general pose 
peculiar challenges to China’s Party hegemony. From being an underground 
rapper, participating The Rap and other mainstream shows, to being banned and 
resurfacing with patriotic songs, GAI’s style has evidently morphed from the jianghu 
grassroots style and identity to the xinhua nationalism style. His swagger, whose 
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meaning is more obtuse than obvious, could be read as differentiating (hence the 
hip hop label), threatening (hence the ban), or nation loving (hence the official 
endorsement). The obtuse meaning of the swaggering style is polysemous.
The polysemy of his style is further enhanced by the dialectic of action and 
reaction. On the surface, GAI has been tamed by the state crackdown, as 
reflected by his style change, and the Party hegemony has been maintained. 
This study, however, argues that the crackdown itself is about coercion, which 
subverts hegemony. Without the subaltern’s spontaneous consent toward the 
dominate group, hegemony faces a peril. GAI’s style transformation has therefore 
engendered a paradox for the Party hegemony, whereby the Chinese state has 
won the battle but is losing the war over hegemony.
By making a connection between signification of style and hegemony, this study 
makes a theoretical contribution that opens a new line of inquiry with respect to 
the meanings of subcultural styles, which are more often obtuse than obvious, 
and pose a peculiar challenge to hegemony. Such an inquiry is particularly 
relevant in today’s media landscape, as the plethora of media in a digital age only 
broadens and deepens the polysemy of subcultural styles. Is state censorship still 
effective in the face of such polysemy? Is it still possible to maintain the Gramscian 
hegemony in a fragmented media world? The study calls for reconsideration and 
reconfiguration of hegemony in relation to subcultural styles.
This study has limitations, the most prominent being that it only highlights the 
hegemonic implication of the hip hop style in China.  In this regard, it needs to be 
noted that the hip hop culture, even in China, has very broad social, economic, 
cultural and political implications, which provide vast researchable areas for future 
studies to explore.
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Appendix: List of Videos Analyzed
 Song Type URL
Gangsta
Tian Gan Wu Zao
Kong Cheng Ji
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Performance on “The Rap of China”
Performance on “The Rap of China”
Performance on “The Rap of China”
Performance on 
“I Want to Be on Chun Wan”
Performance on “The Singer”
Music Video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4GWF8_MgK4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jeo8tf0ZMkw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3wFfzWtlz0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtODEsdIp8Y
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTezYyU_zbU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3PazbAYoHK8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8A4JCbf-2dY
